The Kantian defence of murder. by Jones,  Henry
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
10 June 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Jones, Henry (2016) 'The Kantian defence of murder.', in Beyond responsibility to protect : generating change
in international law. Cambridge: Intersentia, pp. 31-52. International law. (16).
Further information on publisher's website:
http://intersentia.com/en/beyond-responsibility-to-protect.html
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
PART I
THE MORAL UNDERPINNINGS 
AND POLITICAL ENDS OF R2P
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THE KANTIAN DEFENCE OF MURDER
Henry Jones
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e Responsibility to Protect (R2P) did not appear in this world fully formed in 
the International Commission’s report on Intervention and State Sovereignty.1 
Rather, that report was ‘an attempt to integrate pre-existing but dispersed 
practices of protection into a coherent account of international authority’.2 
It is an idea with a long history. Anne Orford ’s historical account of the 
development of the idea of protection draws attention to how it interacts with 
sovereignty and self-determination, particularly in decolonising states. Orford ’s 
account of R2P asks an old question of this new discourse – who decides? 
Who decides what protection is, or who can off er protection.3 Th e language of 
responsibility and protection provides potential concrete grounds for judging 
who is an eff ective sovereign, but it also moves away from the traditional values 
of sovereignty as originating in the people, and moves to an external judgement 
by the international community.4 I want to look at one particular form of 
justifi cation for intervention within a state, which Orford also addressed 
more recently: the idea of a moral duty derived from Kant .5 However, whereas 
Orford primarily addresses Kenneth Walzer as representative of this form of 
argument, I will critically engage with two writers who more directly draw 
on Kant for their ‘moral internationalism’: Jürgen Habermas6 and Fernando 
1 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Th e 
Responsibility to Protect (2001) available at <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20
Report.pdf> accessed 17.05.2015.
2 A. Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect Cambridge University 
Press, 2011, p. 2.
3 Ibid. See also on the question of “who decides” A. Orford, ‘Moral Internationalism and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ Th e European Journal of International Law (2013) 24, 83.
4 Ibid.
5 Orford, ‘Moral Internationalism’ (n. 3) 87–9.
6 Habermas has of course produced a huge body of work, but here I will primarily focus upon 
his essay J. Habermas, ‘Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefi t of Two Hundred 
Years’ Hindsight’, in J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), Perpetual Peace: Essays on 
Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal, MIT Press, 1997.
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Tesón .7 Both these leading proponents of a moral basis for intervention use 
Kant to support their argument. I call this the Kantian defence of murder.
Th ese arguments in support of intervention are based primarily on Kant ’s 
essay ‘Perpetual Peace : A Philosophical Sketch’.8 In this famous work Kant sets 
out what would be required to guarantee a state of perpetual peace . Lawyers have 
failed to achieve peace, their work amounting merely to ‘sorry comfort’ in the 
face of politics.9 What is needed is a set of specifi c changes in the structure of 
global politics. Kant ’s essay is fundamentally about how to secure a universal , 
normative, metaphysical moral ity which applies to all rational beings, as 
described in ‘Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Moral s’.10 As such it describes 
the fi nal point of human development, anticipated in Kant ’s teleological works.11 
Th e actual essay contains preliminary articles about how to achieve peace, and 
defi nitive articles on how to order the world to secure peace once it is achieved. 
Importantly, Kant ’s state of perpetual peace is yet to come. It is a future condition 
postponed until aft er humanity has developed. Anybody outside of the ‘lawful 
state’ which seeks perpetual peace is an enemy.12 Any man who lives outside of 
this ordered society ‘robs me of any security and injures me by virtue of this very 
state in which he coexists with me… he is a permanent threat to me, and I can 
require him either to enter into a common lawful state along with me or to move 
away from my vicinity’.13 For Kant , the pursuit of peace requires forcing others 
to live in a particular way. In the supplements to ‘Perpetual Peace ’ Kant is even 
clearer: ‘Nature has chosen war as a means of attaining the end [development]’.14 
Warfare, confl ict and struggle are the tools which will lead to perpetual peace , 
but it may well be the peace of the graveyard.15
R2P is the latest manifestation of a justifi cation for intervention , warfare 
and killing which bases its claim on a moral position which is to some extent 
inherited from Kant . In his political philosophy, Kant also off ers a detailed 
and extensive body of moral philosophy which provides tools for judging 
the morality of diff erent actions. Kant ’s thinking has been appealing to both 
7 Tesón’s main works are: F. Teson, A Philosophy of International Law, Westview, 1998; F. 
Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention, Transnational, 1988; and F. Tesón, ‘Th e Kantian Th eory 
of International Law’ (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 54.
8 I. Kant, ‘Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’ in I. Kant, Political Writings (H. 
Reiss ed.), Cambridge University Press, 1970, 98.
9 Ibid., 103.
10 I. Kant, ‘Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals’ in I. Kant, Practical Philosophy (M.J. 
Gregor ed.), Cambridge University Press, 1996.
11 In particular see I. Kant ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ in 
Kant, Political Writings (n. 8) p. 41.
12 Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’ (n. 8) p. 98.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 111.
15 Ibid., 98. Kant begins the essay with a joke about a sign over a public house called Th e 
Perpetual Peace and showing a graveyard.
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international lawyers and political philosophers.16 Oft en, Kant ’s thinking 
provides a framework for a justifi cation of intervention of diff erent sorts, an 
opportunity to judge an action against the ‘Categorical Imperative’, or ‘the 
Universal Principles of International Justice’. I want to look at the interpretations 
and application of Kant ’s thinking. My intention is to try and provide a useful 
insight into the use of this moral theorising in international law and see if it can 
illuminate and explain the development of the R2P doctrine as a contribution to 
and strengthening of this form of argument.
Orford has considered the increased force of moral argument in international 
law in light of R2P in a subsequent article.17 Th is is another aspect of the 
transformative eff ect of R2P, in moving towards an international order which 
safeguards common interests and values. But the question remains, who decides 
what are our common interests and values. As Orford concludes at the very 
end of the book, R2P draws attention to the work of law and politics ‘that takes 
place in the attempt to move between metaphysics and physics, universal and 
particular, ideal and real, or then and now’.18 Both Tesón and Habermas attempt 
to put the universal categories they have learnt from Kant to work on the ground 
through a moral form of argument in support of intervention . R2P makes these 
moves from the universal to the particular even more applicable, and thus a close 
examination of the arguments and their problems more pressing. Th e imposition 
of the universal on to the particular is imperialism . By engaging with Habermas 
and Tesón I am engaging critically with two main forms of this moralising .
Th ere are a variety of diff erent attempts to justify a policy of intervention 
based on Kant ’s thinking.19 Th is is broadly an appeal to Kantian morality as a 
way to escape from the contradiction between sovereignty and human rights. 
Generally, the appeal to moral ity to answer law’s indeterminacy is familiar,20 
as is the appeal to Kantian moral ity in particular. Looking at intervention 
16 A couple of good examples of international lawyers engaging with Kant, albeit in very 
diff erent ways, would include P. CAPPS, ‘Th e Kantian Project in Modern International Legal 
Th eory’ (2001) 12  European Journal of International Law 1010; and M. KOSKENNIEMI, 
‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Refl ections on Kantian Th emes About International Law and 
Globalisation’ (2006) 8 Th eoretical Enquiries in Law 9. In political philosophy, the work of 
John Rawls and Th omas Pogge, as well as Habermas, are most notable.
17 Orford, ‘Moral Internationalism’ (n. 3).
18 Orford, International Authority (n. 2) 212.
19 Other than the two authors considered here, some prominent work in this area includes: 
K. Waltz, ‘Kant, Liberalism and War’ (1962) 56 American Political Science Review 331; M. 
Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Aff airs’ (1983) 12 Philosophy & Public Aff airs 205 
& 12(4) Philosophy & Public Aff airs 323; M. Desch, ‘America’s Liberal Illiberalism’ (2007.8) 
32 International Security 7; B. Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective, 
Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2000; A. Bellamy, Just Wars, Polity, 2006; M. Evans (ed.) 
Just War Th eory: A Reappraisal, Edinburgh University Press, 2005.
20 Th e leading proponent of the ‘indeterminacy thesis’ is Martti Koskenniemi, and his clearest 
expression of it is perhaps M. Koskenniemi, ‘Th e Politics of International Law’ 1 European 
Journal of International Law (1990) 4. All of the arguments referenced above in some way rely 
on morality to escape from this confl ict between sovereignty and human rights.
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is looking at a very specifi c claim. Not just that there is some moral ity (which 
moral ity?) which can help us escape indeterminacy and lead to justice (whose 
justice?), but that our moral ity helps us settle a specifi c legal question: ‘when is it 
legal to intervene in the internal aff airs of a state?’21 Th e general question of the 
relation between law and moral ity is set aside here, and my focus is solely on the 
Kantian justifi cation of intervention . Habermas and Tesón off er two of the best 
known arguments in support of some form of intervention . Habermas justifi es 
intervention as lawful within a cosmopolitan legal order. In such an order 
intervention can and must be carried out according to the law. Interventions 
must be by legal uses of force, and when they are, they are no longer conceived 
as ‘wars’, but as police enforcement actions.22 Tesón takes a diff erent approach 
to Kant . Tesón instead focuses on what is moral ly required, both by states in 
relation to their own people, and the duties other states and peoples owe to 
each other. Human rights violations are moral ly wrong, and must be stopped. 
Intervention to stop a human rights violation is moral ly justifi ed, and the law 
is trumped by this moral ity. In the pages that follow I will consider these two 
arguments in turn as forms of moral internationalism which are particularly 
relevant in an age of responsibility and protection. R2P makes these arguments 
stronger and gives them new ways of taking eff ect. Th erefore, engagement with 
these ideas is timely and important. 
2. KANTIAN THEORIES OF INTERVENTION 
2.1. HABERMAS : A LEGAL ARGUMENT
Jürgen Habermas , in a well-known essay, attempted to reformulate Kant ’s 
cosmopolitan ideal to fi t the present day.23 Habermas asserts straight away 
that Kant ’s political philosophy leads ultimately ‘to a global legal order that 
unites all peoples and abolishes war’.24 International law off ers peremptory 
norms25 to govern war which ‘are valid only until pacifi cation through law 
shows the way to a cosmopolitan order that abolishes war’.26 Th e possibility 
of this cosmopolitan order is developed in ‘Perpetual Peace ’. Kant ’s proposals 
21 A subsidiary question would be what does intervention mean, and this is addressed later in 
the chapter.
22 John Rawls is of course also a well-known philosopher associated with these questions. 
I exclude him from my discussion here as his theory is similar to Habermas’s, but less 
persuasive and less clearly and rigorously based in Kantian theory.
23 Habermas, ‘Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight’ (n. 6).
24 Ibid., 113.
25 Th is is Habermas’s idea of peremptory norms, and he does not elaborate. For the orthodox 
view, see J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed.), OUP, 2012, 
594–8.
26 Habermas, ‘Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight’ (n. 6) 113.
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are unavoidably structured by his contemporary setting. Habermas off ers to 
reformulate Kant ’s ideas ‘with a view to the contemporary global situation’.27 
In particular, Habermas sets out to defeat objections to the universal ism of plans 
for cosmopolitan law, by setting out the distinction between law and moral s. Th is 
part of his argument is directed primarily against the work of Carl Schmitt .28 
Th ese arguments also have renewed force and relevance when considering the 
universal category of protection in R2P. In Habermas ’s essay, Kant starts from 
two outdated premises of limited warfare29 and of nation states which have 
absolute internal sovereignty.30 Th ese two premises have to be corrected, to take 
account of modern, unlimited warfare, and of the more fl uid distinction between 
domestic and foreign policy. It is because of the limited nature of war in Kant ’s 
experience that he cannot envisage a legal regulation on making war, only a law 
in war. On sovereignty, it is because of the exceptional nature of the democratic 
constitutional state, only America and revolutionary France in Kant ’s time, that 
Kant cannot see ‘the possibility of a community of peoples under the hegemony 
of a powerful state’.31 Th is produces the contradictions found in the text 
concerning whether a coercive union of states or merely a voluntary federation is 
necessary to secure perpetual peace .
Next, Habermas addresses three features of perpetual peace which have 
turned out to be mistaken, but which nevertheless contain ‘a peculiar dialectical 
quality’.32 Th ey are the peaceful nature of republics, the power of world trade 
to create communal ties, and the function of the political public sphere.33 
Kant claimed that the republican form of government causes states to lose their 
bellicose character since the citizen’s consent is required before engaging in 
war, and citizens, acting in their own self-interest, would be reluctant to give 
this consent.34 In this case, Habermas says, the power of nationalism showed 
Kant to be over-optimistic. Th e move from mercenary armies to national citizen 
militias, which Kant saw as essential to guarantee peace, was in fact vital to 
the huge increase in the scale of war. But Habermas has indicated that these 
historical trends are dialectical, and here he argues that liberal states have not 
entered into wars with one another. Citizens do have an impact on the way 
that their state makes wars. Public opinion aff ects the choice of wars which are 
27 Ibid., 114.
28 For a discussion and defence of Schmitt’s position see W. Rasch, Sovereignty and its 
Discontents: On the Primacy of Confl ict and the Structure of the Political, Birkbeck Law Press, 
2004, particularly chapter 2, ‘A just war? Or just a war? Schmitt vs Habermas’.
29 Habermas, ‘Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight’ (n. 6) 115.
30 Ibid., 118–9.
31 Ibid., 119.
32 Habermas, ‘Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight’ (n. 6) 119. Dialectical is here used in the 
Hegelian sense, in that these theses of Kant’s contain a negative which is perceived through 
experience, leading to the concrete.
33 Ibid.
34 Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’ (n. 8) 100.
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entered into. Wars fought for ‘the implementation of democracy and human 
rights’ have become prevalent.35 Whether this is simply the way that wars are 
sold to citizens, rather than the infl uence of people upon governments, is not a 
doubt which enters Habermas ’s argument.
Th e growth of world trade is also viewed by Habermas as having a dialectical 
character. Kant was incorrect to say that the greater interdependence of 
diff erent societies would lead to peace, as the growth of capitalism created 
internal class confl icts and civil wars and external wars of imperial conquest 
and domination.36 However, Habermas explains, aft er the Second World War 
the invention of the welfare state calmed class antagonisms and globalisation 
provided the spread of social and cultural relationships needed to bring peaceful 
economic integration. Th e denationalisation of the economy separated economic 
and political concerns, and national politics has lost its control over the 
conditions of production, rendering it neither popular nor possible to fi ght wars 
for economic gain. In Habermas ’s terms ‘“soft  power” forces “hard power” aside 
and robs the subjects Kant had counted on in his association of free states of the 
very basis for their independence’.37 
Th irdly, Habermas describes the dialectical character of the political 
public sphere. Th e requirement of publicity is the requirement to off er proper 
justifi cations for the actions of a government.38 However, again in developments 
Kant could not have foreseen, the public sphere has been transformed by 
‘electronic mass media, semantically degenerated, and taken over by images and 
virtual realities’.39 By such means, this enlightenment value of ‘“speech and 
discussion”’ has been utterly transformed into forms of indoctrination without 
language and linguistic deception’.40 Habermas is not without hope though that 
something like a global public sphere is beginning to emerge. He cites the outcry 
against the war in Vietnam and the fi rst Gulf War, as well as the many United 
Nations world summits, as examples of issues of importance to a global public, 
and attempts to subject governments to world opinion.41 Th e subjection of states 
to world opinion clearly forms the basis of the second and third pillars of R2P. 
Th e question of whose opinion is unasked. Publicity, as part of an embedded 
liberal constitution, ‘is the medium through which progress in the political 
process of civilizing a population takes place’.42 Habermas puts great emphasis 
on publicity, and dismisses Kant ’s appeals to nature, in his reformulation of 
35 Habermas, ‘Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight’ (n. 6) 121.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 123.
38 Publicity is an important requirement in both Kant’s political and moral philosophy. See, 
for example Kant, ‘An answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ in Kant, Political 
Writings, Cambridge, 1991, p. 54.
39 Habermas, ‘Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight’ (n. 6) 124.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 124–5.
42 Ibid., 125.
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this part of Kant ’s thinking. He adds two other crucial developments that have 
contributed to the realisation of perpetual peace : the outlawing of war, and the 
addition to criminal law of crimes against humanity. As a result of this transition 
from international law to cosmopolitan law, as Habermas calls it, ‘governmental 
subjects of international law lost their general presumption of innocence in a 
supposed state of nature’.43
Aft er these developments and the transition to cosmopolitan law, 
intervention in a sovereign state becomes a matter of policing criminal states or 
criminal actions. Habermas envisages a world where all forms of intervention 
short of physical violence, such as cultural, diplomatic and most importantly 
economic,44 are good.45 External infl uences which destabilise a state are 
nowhere considered, and the responsibility is always with the government of the 
state. Habermas admits to problems in his universal history, but the movement 
is always forward, and the most serious reactions against the ‘civilizing’ of a 
population can be punished. Th ere are a variety of objections immediately 
apparent here. In terms of Habermas ’ updating of Kant , the substitution of 
‘publicity’ for ‘nature’ may use a terminology which is more suited to a 21st 
century audience, but it does serious harm to Kant ’s philosophy. Th e separation 
of nature from moral ity is crucial in Kant ’s political thinking. Th is distinction is 
what separates the political works from the moral works. In ‘Universal History’ 
the progress of the species is according to nature’s plan.46 Without nature, 
developments such as war would be judged according to moral ity, and found to 
be wrongful. It is important that Kant specifi cally makes the development of the 
species not subject to moral ity. Secondly, Habermas claims to be reading Kant 
in context, and observes that we live in diff erent times and therefore need to 
update Kant ’s thinking. However, his view of Kant ’s ‘times’ is very limited. It is 
simply a world of battlefi eld warfare and unlimited sovereignty. No discussion 
is given to colonialism, which was on the verge of its 19th century expansion, 
and the discoveries and developments of which Kant was a keen observer. No 
thought is given to the character of ‘man’ who is developing in Kant ’s plan. 
Th e category ‘man’ is surely more complicated in the 21st century than it was 
for Kant . Presumably Habermas would not exclude women, as Kant did.47 
More importantly, Habermas himself has said that his philosophy is not subject 
43 Ibid., 126.
44 It is worth noting that R2P does not directly address these issues, with ‘sanctions’ being 
discussed very generally in the Secretary General’s reports, see e.g. Report of the Secretary 
General, Th e Responsibility to Protect – Timely and Decisive Response A/66/874–S/2012/578.
45 Th is view can be found in current international law, most obviously on the issue of third-
party countermeasures, proposed in J. Crawford, International Law Commission Yearbook 
2000/II(1) 3, 106–9.
46 Kant, ‘Universal History’ (n. 11).
47 Kant, ‘Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime’ in P. Frierson (ed.) Kant: 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011.
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centred.48 Th irdly, there are the arguments against Kant he does recognise, 
which need a little more consideration.
Habermas has reconceived and reconstructed Kant ’s approach in a number 
of ways, to ‘reconstruct the universal conditions of knowledge and action’.49 
Habermas ’s reconstructed Kant ianism is:
‘dialogical rather than monological, grounded in actual intersubjective practices 
of communication and socialisation rather than in a metaphysical philosophy of 
individual consciousness, context-dependent in a number of ways rather than 
independent, quasi-transcendental rather than transcendental, fallible rather than 
foundational, dependent on hypotheses generated in the empirical and reconstructive 
social sciences rather than free standing, and open to revision rather than certain.’50
Habermas gives us ‘Perpetual Peace ’ as a limit. Th e limit of the constitution is 
liberal, the limit of the economy is global free trade and the limit of the law is a 
public cosmopolitanism. Th ese are limits because they are ‘universal , necessary 
and obligatory’.51
2.1.1. Foucault vs Habermas 
Michel Foucault sought to show that limits that are ‘given to us as universal , 
necessary, and obligatory’ are actually ‘singular, contingent, and the product 
of arbitrary constraints’.52 Foucault ’s opposition to Habermas goes far beyond 
my discussion here,53 but his objections can be applied to Habermas ’s specifi c 
argument concerning ‘Perpetual Peace ’. Tully analyses four objections Foucault 
had to Habermas : that Habermas is not truly critical, that his own approach 
is reasonable, that a genealogy of the decentred subject is possible, and that 
Habermas is utopian.54 Th e fi rst and last are relevant here.55
Foucault criticises Habermas for not being truly critical, in that Habermas 
is not critical of his form of refl ection. As Foucault puts it ‘there is always 
something ludicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the 
48 J. Habermas, Th e Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, MIT Press, 1987.
49 M. Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in P. Rainbow (ed.), Th e Foucault Reader, Pantheon, 
1984, 46.
50 J. Tully, ‘To Th ink and Act Diff erently’ in S. Ashenden and D. Owen (eds.), Foucault Contra 
Habermas: Recasting the Dialogue between Genealogy and Critical Th eory, SAGE Publications, 
1999, 84.
51 Ibid., 94.
52 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (n. 49).
53 Th e essays in Ashenden and Owen, Foucault Contra Habermas (n. 50) are an excellent 
starting point concerning the engagement between Habermas and Foucault, and their 
respective supporters.
54 Tully, ‘To Th ink and Act Diff erently’ (n. 50).
55 Th e other two objections concern the method of philosophy used by the two thinkers, the 
detail and implications of which are beyond my current argument.
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outside, to dictate to others, to tell them where their truth is and how to fi nd 
it’.56 Essentially, Habermas ’s decentred subject is assumed as the ideal subject. 
Furthermore, this form of the subject only appears in modern societies, with 
‘second-order concepts’, which allow for refl ection on one’s own culture, 
which has a decentring eff ect, and ‘demands similar processes of learning and 
adaptation of any culture that crosses it’.57 Habermas does not allow other 
cultures access to this universal subject, as they are developmentally behind. 
Habermas ’s position is developmental, not contextual, posits a universal subject, 
and universal limits on human developments. If nothing else, we can complain 
that this limits political action and potential. It is surely much more promising to 
‘give up ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete 
and defi nitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’,58 and 
therefore permit our theory to engage with what is particular, contingent and 
arbitrary. Th e conditions of sovereignty recast as responsibility should have this 
focus, rather than the universal form that R2P adopts.
Th e objection that Habermas is utopian was made by Foucault in an 
interview in 1984. In discussing his interest in Habermas , he said:
‘Th ere is always something which causes me a problem. It is when he assigns a very 
important place to relations of communication and also a function that I would call 
‘utopian’. Th e thought that there could be a state of communication which would 
be such that the games of truth could circulate freely, without obstacles, without 
constraint and without coercive eff ects, seems to me to be Utopia.’59
Habermas ’s idea of communicative action and communicative rationality appear 
in his discussion of ‘Perpetual Peace ’, in his arguments concerning publicity.60 
Th ey are utopian not because Habermas does not believe in power relations, 
but because he believes that discourses are separable from the power relations 
which shape them. Th e attempt of R2P to be a truly objective discourse also 
suff ers from this utopian thinking. Th is is utopian in two senses; fi rstly, because 
there is no place where discourse can be free of power, and secondly, to look at 
discourse in such a way, to measure them against this abstract regulative ideal, is 
to ‘abstract oneself from what is really going on and the possibilities of concrete 
freedom within them’.61 For Foucault , freedom can only be found within power 
relations, as they are pervasive. Any attempt to discover something outside of 
56 M. Foucault, Th e Uses of Pleasure, Vintage Books, 1985, 9.
57 J. Habermas, Justifi cation and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, MIT Press, 1994, 
157–8.
58 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (n. 49) 47.
59 M. Foucault, ‘Interview’ in J. Bernauer and D. Rasmussen (eds.), Th e Final Foucault, MIT 
Press, 1988, 18.
60 Habermas sets out his theory of communicative action in Th e Th eory of Communicative 
Action, 2 vols, Beacon Press, 1984.
61 Tully, ‘To Th ink and Act Diff erently’ (n. 50) 131.
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power relations is purely abstract, and distracts attention from what is concrete 
and real.  To crudely apply this to the subject of humanitarian intervention , 
Habermas ignores the very real eff ects of economic and political intervention ,62 
which destabilise relations, worrying instead about whether these intervention s 
and the violence which follows fi t his regulative ideal. While Habermas may be 
willing to alter the ideal to better work on actual reality, it might be simpler to 
drop the ideal entirely.
2.1.2. Schmitt vs Habermas 
Habermas places his theory in specifi c opposition to Carl Schmitt ’s thought in 
his ‘Perpetual Peace ’ essay.63 In Habermas ’s terms, Schmitt ’s political theory 
has two basic propositions: ‘that the politics of human rights leads to wars 
that are disguised as police actions to lend them a moral quality and that this 
moral isation stamps the enemy as an inhuman criminal and thus opens the 
fl oodgates’.64 William Rasch summarises Habermas ’s task as ‘to demonstrate, 
in explicit opposition to Carl Schmitt ’s criticisms, that … a world state does not 
represent a moral or political despotism’.65 His world state is: 
‘Th e United Nations of the World, [which] ought to be cast in the image of the United 
States of America. […] Th ere will be no discrepancy between state and cosmopolitan 
law because state law will simply be cosmopolitan law realised at the local level. Th e 
‘community of peoples’ will not be hindered by the internal sovereignty of nation 
states and therefore will be able to exact ‘compliance with its rules’, presumably by 
use of military might. Th e triumph of this strong version of the cosmopolitan ideal 
not only necessitates the obsolescence of historical nation-states, reducing them 
to ‘provinces’ of a larger, all-encompassing federation; it also requires the global 
establishment of liberal constitutions, guaranteeing (as yet unspecifi ed) human 
rights and dismantling regimes that are deemed illiberal, traditionally authoritarian, 
or theocratic. Not only will there be one world government, there will be one world 
religion, a secular religion of the rights of man.’66
62 For an excellent illustration of the external causes of war in the former Yugoslavia, see A. 
Orford, ‘Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions aft er the Cold 
War’ (1997) 38 Harvard International Law Journal 443.
63 Habermas mostly refers to C. Schmitt, Th e Concept of the Political, Rutgers University Press, 
1976. In the discussion that follows I primarily draw on secondary sources who have put 
Schmitt and Habermas’ thought in dialogue at much greater length than is available to me 
here.
64 Habermas, ‘Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight’ (n. 6).
65 Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents (n. 28) 52. For a detailed discussion of this work as a 
whole, see J. Beckett, ‘Confl icting Orders: How Peace is Waged’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 281.
66 Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents (n. 28) 55.
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Th is cosmopolitan world order of perpetual peace may well seem attractive. But 
it is a world which bans opposition and politics. Th ere is one world order, and one 
set of rights. Habermas ‘reduces the foreign to the domestic and the domestic to 
the legal’.67 In Schmitt ’s thinking, ‘the political world is a pluriverse’,68 the only 
world in which a multitude of views can exist. By reducing this to the legal, only 
one view can exist. Th e legal, contrary to what Habermas suggests, is not free of 
interests; ‘the legal always refl ects someone’s interests’,69 but these interests are 
not perceived by those putting forward the law. Th is is imperialism again and 
again, subsuming the other under a universal . Schmitt , in prioritising politics 
and confl ict, asks the question whether there is now any place for political 
confl ict outside of the supervision of this legal moral ity.70 Furthermore, any 
opposition to this moral ity becomes a terrorist action in a global police state. Th e 
outlawing of war leads to the outlawing of opposition in general.71 To bring R2P 
back in, when Schmitt famously declares that the state presupposes politics,72 
R2P disagrees and declares that protection is primary. Th is is explicitly stated 
in the fi rst pillar. Before politics can happen within a state, the state must 
provide protection. Th is externally imposed condition disallows any genuine 
politics which must carry with it the ultimate risk of confl ict, warfare and death. 
Habermas ’s neo-Kant ian theory advocates a perpetual war to compel those who 
are diff erent to join the world order in the name of perpetual peace . As Rasch 
says in opposition to this, ‘Schmitt the nationalist might also be Schmitt the 
international multiculturalist’.73
In his reconstruction of Kant ’s proposal Habermas views the achievement 
of perpetual peace as a process requiring the growth of cosmopolitan law and 
the current situation as a transition from international law to cosmopolitan 
law.74 Th is process permits and requires certain forms of intervention , generally 
non-violent, and specifi cally economic sanctions. Th is may be a form of ‘gentle 
compulsion’,75 but force is inherent in these actions. Th is reconstruction of 
perpetual peace allows for intervention alongside the process of building a 
cosmopolitan order of a genuinely democratic United Nations with coercive 
powers through law. Th is lawful coercion is peaceful; it is peaceful in the same 
way as are police actions within the domestic constitution.76 R2P provides an 
67 Ibid., 62.
68 Ibid., 59.
69 Beckett ‘Confl icting Orders’ (n. 65) 290.
70 Schmitt, Th e Concept of the Political, Chicago Press, 1996, 53–8.
71 See in particular Schmitt, Th e Nomos of the Earth, Telos Press, 2003 Chapter 7.
72 Schmitt, Th e Concept of the Political, Chicago Press, 1996, 19.
73 Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents (n. 28) 62.
74 Habermas, ‘Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight’ (n. 6) 130.
75 Ibid., 133,.
76 Th is analogy of intervention as police action is widespread in the intervention discourse. For 
example Tom Farer refers repeatedly to ‘the cops’ in T. Farer, ‘Intervention in Unnatural 
Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the First Phase’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 1. 
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opportunity to apply these arguments and ideas again, judging the validity of 
a state according to how it protects its citizens. Whatever the specifi cs of the 
pillars; this language changes the focus of international law and intervention 
by making sovereignty conditional upon this responsibility. R2P greatly 
increases the power of hegemonic states to declare other states, most obviously 
those which embrace a competing ideology, illegitimate and therefore open to 
intervention and force.
Cosmopolitan law holds a monopoly on the use of force . R2P, in its most 
basic form of the three pillars, looks like a form of cosmopolitan law , inviting 
the community to judge other members against universal standards. Only 
lawful coercive force can be exercised and it can only be exercised by the 
world community acting through the United Nations. Crucially, Habermas 
has replaced nature with this process of development from international to 
cosmopolitan law. In this process, wars are fought by liberal states against 
non-liberal states. However, where they are in line with cosmopolitan law, they 
are no-longer conceived as wars but as police actions. As he says elsewhere, 
‘the erosion of the principle of non-intervention in recent decades has been 
due primarily to the politics of human rights’.77 Human rights as a source of 
legitimacy for aggressive wars are familiar and Kant is used to add philosophical 
weight. As Rasch says, though, in his own conclusion:
‘[O]pposition to this development is not merely anachronistic, it is illegitimate, 
not to be tolerated. […] Aft er all, when push comes to shove, ‘we’ decide – not only 
about which societies are decent and which ones are not, but also about which acts of 
violence are ‘terrorist’, and which comprise the ‘gentle compulsion’ of a ‘just war’.’78
2.2. TESÓN : A MORAL ARGUMENT
Habermas approached Kant ’s text and found in it a limited justifi cation of 
intervention . Fernando Tesón approaches matters from the opposite direction; 
he is looking for a justifi cation of intervention and fi nds it in Kant .79 Whereas 
Habermas attempted to separate law from moral ity, claiming that human rights 
are ‘distinctly juridical in character’,80 and giving intervention force as legal 
Similar language is used in W. M. Reisman, ‘Some Lessons from Iraq: International Law and 
Democratic Politics’ (1991) 16 Yale Journal of International Law 203.
77 J. Habermas, Th e Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Th eory (C. CRONIN and P.D. 
GREIFF eds.) MIT Press, 1998, 147.
78 Rasch, Sovereignty and its Discontents (n. 28) 148.
79 Tesón has applied his moral theory of international law to explore and defend other practices, 
such as targeted killing and the use of mercenaries. See F. Tesón, ‘Targeted Killing and the 
Logic of Double Eff ect’ in A. Altman, C. Finklestein, and J. Ohlin (eds.), Targeted Killings: 
Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World, OUP, 2012; and F. Tesón ‘Humanitarian 
Intervention: Loose Ends’ (2011) 10 Journal of Military Ethics 192.
80 Habermas, Th e Inclusion of the Other (n. 77) 137.
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coercion, Tesón argues that ‘intervention is moral ly justifi ed in appropriate 
cases’.81
Tesón defends a liberal theory of international law in which ‘the end of states 
and governments is to benefi t, serve, and protect their components, human 
beings; and the end of international law must also be to benefi t, serve, and 
protect human beings, and not its components, states and governments’.82 In 
such a system ‘the notion of state sovereignty is redefi ned: the sovereignty of the 
state is dependent upon the states domestic legitimacy’,83 and ultimately ‘respect 
for states is merely derivative of respect for persons’.84 ‘Kant was the fi rst to 
defend this thesis’,85 says Tesón , and he ‘reconstructs and examines Kant ’s theory 
as put forth in his famous essay ‘Perpetual Peace ’.86 His reading of ‘Perpetual 
Peace ’ is very detailed, but can be summarised quite straight forwardly. He 
prioritises human rights, and thus focuses on the Defi nitive Articles, whereas 
‘[c]ommentators in the realist tradition, who emphasize the primacy of the state 
as the international actor, exalt the Preliminary Articles’.87 Tesón focuses on the 
Defi nitive Articles, particularly the requirement that states be republican.88 
Tesón ’s main focus is on the three principles upon which the republican 
constitution rests: freedom, due process, and equality. He gives four arguments 
for why liberal democracies are peaceful: the ‘consent of the citizens’, the 
separation of powers, the education of citizens, and free trade. He relies on 
the ‘consent of the citizens’ passage in the First Defi nitive Article as supplying 
the argument that ‘if people are self-governed, citizens on both sides of any 
dispute will be very cautious in bringing about a war whose consequences 
they themselves must bear’.89 In contrast, ‘the tyrant does not suff er the 
consequences’, so ‘it is relatively easy for a despot to start a war’.90 Th e 
separation of powers argument is that ‘a liberal democracy creates a system of 
mutual controls and relative diff usion of power that complicates and encumbers 
governmental decisions about war’.91 Th irdly, Tesón argues that in Kant’s 
81 F. Tesón, ‘Th e Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’ in L. Holzgrefe and R. 
Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical Legal and Political Dilemmas (CUP 
2003) 93. Tesón fi rst articulated his Kantian Th eory in ‘Th e Kantian Th eory of International 
Law’ (n. 7). He elaborated his thesis in the monograph A Philosophy of International Law 
(n. 7). Th e book chapter quoted here specifi cally addresses intervention from his Kantian 
perspective.
82 Tesón, ‘Th e Kantian Th eory of International Law’ (n. 7).
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 58. Tesón’s reference is to F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Th eory and 
Practice in the History of Relations between States, Cambridge University Press, 1967.
88 Tesón uses ‘republican’ and ‘liberal democracy’, interchangeably, and explains this at Ibid., 
61–2.
89 Ibid., 74.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., 75.
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republic ‘citizens will be educated in the principles of right and therefore war 
will appear to them as the evil that every rational person knows it is’.92 His fi nal 
argument is that ‘liberal democracies foster free trade and a generous system of 
freedom of international movement’93 and that war is a costly threat to both.
It is worth pausing here and considering R2P again. As I have been arguing, 
R2P moves the authority to judge the sovereign away from the people and 
gives it to the international community, whoever they may be. Th is means that 
the requirement of states to be democratic has become unnecessary as a step 
towards perpetual peace . So long as powerful democracies exist which are able to 
intervene, they can judge the decisions of any tyrant. A people may be subject to 
a despot, but the international community now has objective standards against 
which to judge a state. Sovereignty no longer protects the tyrant under R2P and 
this would be a good thing if we could truly be sure of those objective standards: 
their universal applicability, and the bona fi de intentions of the international 
community.
Returning to Tesón , he groups as Kant ’s ‘empirical argument’ the four points 
mentioned above: consent of the citizens, the separation of powers, the education 
of citizens, and free trade.94 Th is is followed with a straightforward normative 
argument: ‘governments should be required by international law to observe 
human rights because that is the right thing to do’.95 Th is is found in Kant , for 
whom ‘the universal requirement of human rights and democracy [is] grounded 
in “the purity of its origin, a purity whose source is the pure concept of right”’.96 
Th is normative argument that ‘a global requirement of a republican constitution 
logically follows from the categorical imperative’,97 is, for Tesón , Kant ’s main 
argument. Tesón then dismisses the pacifi st sections of Kant ’s essay, off ering ‘a 
reading more consistent with the rest of Kant ’s views’, that ‘the non-intervention 
principle is dependent upon compliance with the First Defi nitive Article’,98 that 
is, that it only applies to liberal democracies. As Tesón puts it, ‘sovereignty is to 
be respected only when it is justly exercised’.99 It leads to the larger claim that 
states which are not liberal democracies are not obeying cosmopolitan law. R2P 
might contemplate a category between these, of states which are unable rather 
than unwilling. Tesón does not. States, like humans, have basic, universal , 
natural laws which they are able to follow. To not do so renders them liable to 
punishment.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., 76.
94 Ibid., 74. For a good discussion of the shortcomings of Tesón’s empirical methodology see 
P. Capps, ‘Th e Kantian Project in Modern International Legal Th eory’ (2001) 12  European 
Journal of International Law 1010–14.
95 Ibid., 81.
96 Ibid, quoting Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’ (Tesón’s emphasis).
97 Ibid., 82.
98 Ibid., 92.
99 Ibid.
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Th e clearest application by Tesón of his Kant ian theory to the subject 
of intervention is in the book chapter ‘Th e Liberal Case for Humanitarian 
Intervention’.100 In this essay Tesón restates in similar terms his Kant ian 
theory of international law. Individuals, as rights holders, are the primary unit 
of consideration. Governments are only legitimate as protectors of rights. He 
starts with the claim that ‘Governments… who seriously violate [human] rights 
undermine the one reason that justifi es their political power, and thus should not 
be protected by international law’.101 He adds to this three moral assumptions: 
the obligation to respect rights, the obligation to promote respect for rights, and 
the obligation to rescue victims of rights abuses.102 Th is third duty entails a right 
of humanitarian intervention . Th e limits on this intervention Tesón sets are 
proportionate force, used by a liberal state or alliance, to end tyranny or anarchy, 
which is welcomed by the victims, and that any harms are side eff ects of the good 
intentions and actions. Th e last point is ‘the doctrine of double eff ect’.103Th e rest 
of the Tesón ’s chapter is a defence of this position against various criticisms 
or non-intervention ist positions: relativism, sovereignty, law, order, and 
libertarianism.104 He dismisses each fairly easily. Relativism is dismissed 
generally as lacking merit as a philosophical position,105 and specifi cally on the 
basis that intervention is only justifi ed in cases where no moral theory, western 
liberal or otherwise, could fi nd the breach of rights acceptable. In terms of 
sovereignty , as I have discussed above, Tesón views only liberal states as truly 
possessing sovereignty, so national borders can have no moral force against 
a case for intervention . Where there are practical advantages for respecting 
state borders, such as stability and legal certainty, they would be trumped 
by the moral case for intervention . To the objection that international law 
prohibits humanitarian intervention ,106 Tesón says fi rstly that this is debatable, 
and debated, by lawyers, and secondly that, if international law does prohibit 
humanitarian intervention , then ‘international law is moral ly objectionable’107 
and should be reformed. To the suggestion that global order and stability are 
threatened by intervention , Tesón again replies that this concern has no moral 
100 Tesón, ‘Th e Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’ (n. 81).
101 Ibid., 93.
102 Ibid., 94.
103 Th is is elaborated at Ibid., 115–7. In brief, it means simply that any bad consequences of an 
action are outweighed by the good, and therefore permissible.
104 Ibid., 100–129.
105 Ibid., 100: ‘I have never been able to see merit in relativism as a general philosophical view’. 
See further F. Tesón ‘Human Rights and Cultural Relativism’ (1985) 25 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 869.
106 Tesón cites I. Brownlie, ‘Th oughts on Kind-hearted Gunmen’ in R. Lillich (ed.), 
Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (University Press of Virginia 1973). See 
also Patrick Capps’ review of A Philosophy of International Law, which concludes that Tesón 
off ers a Kantian moral foreign policy rather than a Kantian international law; P. Capps, ‘Th e 
Kantian Project in Modern International Legal Th eory’ (n. 68) 1003.
107 Tesón, ‘Th e liberal case for humanitarian intervention’ (n. 55) 111.
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force when confronted with gross human rights violations. He gives a similar 
response to the libertarian who would claim that it is not in a citizen’s best 
interests for their state to intervene elsewhere, conceding only that professional 
soldiers should be used before volunteers and ultimately conscripts. In summary, 
Tesón ’s moral ity, which allows and demands intervention for breaches of human 
rights, which does not confer sovereignty or even the protection of international 
law on non-liberal states, trumps any other concerns.108
A similar tone was struck by Antonio Cassese, in discussing NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo, who argued that the action was illegal, but ethically 
justifi able.109 Cassese posed the rhetorical question:
‘Should one sit idly by and watch thousands of human beings being slaughtered or 
brutally prosecuted? Should one remain silent and inactive only because the existing 
body of international law rules proves incapable of remedying such a situation? 
Or, rather, should respect for the Rule of Law be sacrifi ced on the altar of human 
compassion?’110
R2P begins to off er a way out, and satisfy both the moral ising international 
lawyer and the formalist. One role that R2P can take is as a device for turning 
moral outrage into lethal legal use of force. Th e moral cry of “never again!” does 
not allow for factual complexities to slow things down, but instead sees the hero 
ride into town and save the day.
2.2.1. Tesón vs Orford 
Orford highlights how this plays into a narrative of a white male hero, stepping in 
to protect innocents and uphold universal values. Th e targets of the intervention 
are in turn depicted as passive victims. Th e international community, in the 
person of NATO and in particular the United States, has a duty to do this. Th is 
action changes ‘Clinton to Clint (Eastwood). In bypassing the UN to sanction 
air strikes, Clinton demonstrates that he “gets things done” by ignoring 
108 It should be noted that others have read Kant as requiring the obedience of bad laws, see J. 
Waldron, ‘Kant’s Legal Positivism’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 1535; and R. Tuck Th e 
Rights of War and Peace (OUP 1999) 207–214. Kant himself wrote ‘Argue as much as you like, 
and about whatever you like, but obey!’ in Kant, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (n. 38) 59.
109 A. Cassese, ‘Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’ (1999) 10  European 
Journal of International Law 23. Other international lawyers who took a similar stance 
include B. Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 EJIL 1; T. 
Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Th reats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge 
University Press 2002); and M.E. O’Connell, ‘Th e UN, NATO and International Law aft er 
Kosovo’ Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2000) 57. An excellent summary of the debates from the 
time can be found in R. Falk, ‘Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law’ 
Th e American Journal of International Law 93(1999) 847. For another good critique of this 
position, see D. Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond (Pluto 2005).
110 Ibid., 25.
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the “suits” and taking matters into his own hands to protect the common 
good.’111Signifi cantly, Tesón does not deal with the charge of colonialism, except 
by implication under relativism.112 Neither does he ever accept that intervention 
may be a bit more complicated than ‘gross human rights violations’ envisaged. He 
is happy to accept what he euphemistically calls ‘interference’.113 Orford draws 
attention to how partial this picture is. In portraying intervention as ‘active’, and 
non-intervention as ‘passive’, Tesón and others over-simplify the engagement of 
the international community in diff erent settings. Th e two standard examples 
employed in this debate are the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
Yugoslavia was subject to austerity programmes and liberalisation implemented 
by the World Bank and IMF in the 1970s, 1980s, and into the 1990s. Orford 
provides compelling evidence that this form of intervention ‘contributed to 
the conditions in which [ethnic] hatreds (whether ancient or otherwise) were 
infl amed’.114 While these changes were presented in purely economic terms, they 
had huge political implications, particularly the centralisation of authority away 
from the republics and the destruction of the socialist system. Th e government 
is left  simply in the role of maintaining law and order, with all control of the 
economic and social life of the nation taken over by the international economic 
organisations. In such a situation, ethnic nationalism off ers a sense of community 
and identity. While it cannot be said that this economic shock therapy caused 
the war and genocide in the former Yugoslavia, it can also not be said that the 
international community was uninvolved and free of blame before war broke 
out. Th e image of a purely local problem, requiring the saving of the people from 
themselves by outside force, is revealed as over simplifi ed.
Rwanda tells a similar story of intervention prior to confl ict being forgotten. 
Th e non-intervention in the face of genocide in Rwanda is the archetypal 
example of what happens when the international community fails to act. Th e 
details of the genocide are well known and horrifying. Th e general view is that 
the international community failed, and the genocide ‘could have been halted 
by forcible intervention ’.115 For many, ‘if there is a clear-cut case to be made for 
intervention , Rwanda was it’.116 Th e general impression is ‘that the international 
community is responsible for the Rwandan genocide due to its failure to use 
111 A. Orford, ‘Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New 
Interventionism’ (1999) 10  European Journal of International Law 695 quoting P. Lentini, 
‘Yugoslavia … Cop Flick, Western, Action Movie’ (1999) 41 Arena Magazine 45.
112 Tesón, ‘Th e liberal case for humanitarian intervention’ (n. 55) 100: ‘I have never been able to 
see merit in relativism as a general philosophical view’. See further F. Tesón ‘Human Rights 
and Cultural Relativism’ (1985) 25 Virginia Journal of International Law 869.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid., 89.
115 V.P. Nanda, T.F. Muther and A.E. Eckert, ‘Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, 
Rwanda and Liberia – Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention under 
International Law – Part II’ (1998) 26 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 851.
116 Ibid.
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force to prevent or halt the genocidal killing’.117 However, as Orford highlights, 
at the time the genocide commenced, there were 2,519 UN peacekeepers in 
Rwanda, and the preparations for the genocide were publicly and internationally 
known, and repeatedly commented on.118 Furthermore, no attempts were made 
to prevent the genocide through non-military means, such as making aid and 
development assistance conditional on ending human rights abuses.119
Orford argues that, once again, the huge involvement of the international 
community and its development enterprise demonstrate that the genocide 
cannot be read as simply having local causes.120 Peter Ulvin has demonstrated 
that aid provided ‘a large share of the fi nancial and moral resources of the 
government and civil society’.121 In eff ect, the provision of aid of all sorts, from 
vaccines to military equipment, ‘helped to maintain the strong state necessary to 
organise and administer the genocide’.122 Once again, the process of economic 
shock therapy was also seen prior to the genocide, with the majority of the 
population forced into poverty during the structural adjustment process. As 
Michel Chossudovsky observed: ‘no sensitivity or concern was expressed as to 
the likely political and social repercussions of economic shock therapy applied to 
a country of the brink of civil war. Th e World Bank team consciously excluded 
the “non-economic” variables from their “simulations”’.123 Furthermore, the 
foreign aid community and their Rwandan assistants lived a comparatively lavish 
lifestyle, which also physically entered the poorest communities, building houses 
and infrastructure to service the foreign experts, decreasing further the already 
scarce land in impoverished farming communities.124 Th is led to humiliation, 
resentment and hatred in the local community. Finally, the aid community and 
the development programme for Rwanda was clearly reminiscent of and based 
within the colonial system which preceded it.125 Again, none of this decisively 
explains why the genocide happened, but it clearly unsettles the picture of a local 
problem which could have been prevented with international involvement.
Tesón presents an incredibly simplistic view of international society, 
comprised of good states, bad states, and those ‘on probation’. His language 
is hugely paternalistic, with the people of those bad states desperate for our 
help. It does not particularly matter in the end whether his reading of Kant 
is right or wrong. It is the use he puts Kant to. Kant gives his view of society 
117 A. Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 99.
118 Ibid., 99–102.
119 P. Ulvin, Aiding Violence: the Development Enterprise in Rwanda, Kumarian Press 1998.
120 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention (n. 117).
121 P. Ulvin, Aiding Violence (n. 119).
122 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention (n. 117) 104.
123 M. Chossudovsky, Th e Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms, 
Zed Books, 1997, 119.
124 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention (n. 117) 106–8.
125 Ibid., 108–9.
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some authority, borrowed from a long dead great philosopher. However, if we 
put Kant ’s thinking in context, then regardless of the best reading of ‘Perpetual 
Peace ’, it can be seen as colonial, as being undermined by its linear teleology, 
and as being as simplistic and problematic a view of the world as Tesón ’s. Th e 
search for philosophical authority to support Tesón ’s view of international law 
is wasted time and eff ort. It would be much more productive to look at the much 
more complicated picture given to us by Orford . R2P allows for the international 
community to sit in judgment on a state and decide whether it has earned its 
sovereignty. It is ‘idiot’s law’.126 My preference is for lawyers, if not the law itself, 
to be sophists, and to recognise the huge complexity of political struggles, over 
the simplicity of moral outrage. Particularly when that moral outrage is given 
force in the shape of bombs.
3. CONCLUSIONS
Th e Responsibility to Protect provides new vigour to these moral ising arguments 
in international law. Th e language of responsibility and protection is genuinely 
transformative where it fl ips the source of sovereign authority. It is no longer 
is it derived from the people, but it is judged by third parties according to the 
standards of protection they defi ne. Th is fi ts perfectly with the arguments for a 
universal cosmopolitan world legal system. However, as with any universal ising 
discourse, it inevitably excludes. As Schmitt argued, the attempt to end war is an 
attempt to end politics, as real politics is not possible without the threat of war. 
Th e opposition to politics is the opposition to diff erence. As Orford argues, R2P 
is a potentially imperialist discourse, directed almost exclusively towards former 
colonies by former imperial powers, who sit in judgement on the eff ectiveness of 
the state. Th e arguments against humanitarian intervention remain important. 
R2P has not swept these ideas aside and created a wholly new paradigm. It has 
changed some of the language, and the structure of the argument. Th is change in 
the structure of legal argument creates huge potential. To fi nish by paraphrasing 
Orford again, if we engage critically with R2P we may come to worry not about 
how to defeat the enemies of humanity, but how to understand them.127
126 T.M. Franck, ‘Porfi ry’s Proposition: Th e Role of Legitimacy and Exculpation in Combating 
Terrorism’, in Y. Dinšein and M. Tabory International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in 
Honour of Shabtai Rosenne 149. Franck does not use the term ‘idiot’ pejoratively, whereas I 
do. Th anks to Richard Barnes for this reference.
127 Orford, ‘Moral Internationalism’ (n. 3) 108.
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